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Brinson: The Anti-Fraud Provisions of the North Carolina Securities Act

The Anti-Fraud Provisions of the North
Carolina Securities Act
CLIFTON L. BRINSON*
INTRODUCTION

Recently, a number of civil cases have been brought under the once
dormant North Carolina Securities Act.' One of these cases gained
attention in 2012 when Judge Murphy of the North Carolina Business
Court held that a plaintiff asserting claims under the North Carolina
Securities Act need not show "scienter"-i.e., intent to defraud.2 Judge
Murphy held that material misrepresentations made in connection with the
purchase or sale of a security are actionable even if the person making the
misrepresentations did not know they were false, so long as the person was
negligent in making the statements.
The decision came as a surprise to many practitioners. The North
CarolinaBusiness Litigation Report stated:
This decision definitely breaks some new ground. You don't have to
show scienter for a state securities claim? . . . Those are real relaxations of

requirements for plaintiffs. It is not clear that these rulings are the law of
North Carolina, but they are the law in Judge Murphy's courtroom.
Whether they'll stick on appeal is an open question.4

Partner, Smith, Anderson, Blount, Dorsett, Mitchell & Jernigan, L.L.P., Raleigh, NC.
B.A., Duke University, 1993. J.D., Yale Law School, 1998.
1. See, e.g., William L. Thorpe Revocable Trust v. Ameritas Inv. Corp., No. 4:11-CV193-D, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 134049 (E.D.N.C. Sept. 19, 2012); Latta v. Rainey, 689
S.E.2d 898, 908-11 (N.C. Ct. App. 2010); Skoog v. Harbert Private Equity Fund, II, LLC,
No. 12 CVS 406, 2013 NCBC LEXIS 17 (N.C. Super. Ct. Mar. 24, 2013); NNN Durham
Office Portfolio 1, LLC v. Highwoods Realty Ltd. P'ship, No. 12 CVS 3945, 2013 NCBC
LEXIS 12 (N.C. Super. Ct. Feb. 19, 2013); Blue Ridge Pediatric & Adolescent Med. v. First
Colony Healthcare, No. 11 CVS 127, 2012 NCBC LEXIS 52 (N.C. Super. Ct. Oct. 3, 2012);
Associated Packaging v. Jackson Paper Mfg., No. 10 CVS 745, 2012 NCBC LEXIS 13
(N.C. Super. Ct. Mar. 1, 2012).
2. Associated Packaging,2012 NCBC LEXIS 13, at *33-38.
3. Id. at *37-38.
4. Mack Sperling, Claims Under The North Carolina Securities Act Are Easier To
Make Now, N.C. Bus. LITIG. REP. (Mar. 5, 2012), http://www.ncbusinesslitigationreport
*
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The appellate question is moot because the case has since settled.' But the
legal question remains: what is required to state a claim under the North
Carolina Securities Act, specifically under the antifraud provisions of the
Act?
Until quite recently, this question had not been examined in any depth,
perhaps because most attorneys (and many courts) assumed the antifraud
provisions of North Carolina Securities Act are merely duplicative of the
federal securities laws. This assumption is understandable, given that the
language of the North Carolina antifraud provisions is similar to the
language of their federal counterparts; both federal and state laws prohibit
selling or purchasing a security by means of "any untrue statement of a
material fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to
make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which
they were made, not misleading...."6 Furthermore, North Carolina courts
have held that the State's antifraud provisions are to be interpreted
consistently with the corresponding federal provisions.7
There are, however, important differences between the antifraud
provisions of the North Carolina Securities Act and the antifraud provisions
of the federal securities laws. The two antifraud provisions of the North
Carolina Securities Act are Section 78A-8 and Section 78A-56(a)(2).
Section 78A-8 closely parallels Rule lOb-5 under the federal securities
laws. 8 But, whereas Rule 1Ob-5 has been interpreted to include a scienter
requirement,9 there is no necessary reason to read a scienter requirement
into Section 78A-8 of the North Carolina Securities Act. There is also,
however, no evidence that the General Assembly intended to create a
private right of action under Section 78A-8 for alleged misrepresentations.
To the contrary, the statute expressly excludes any private right of action
under the pertinent portion of the statute.10

.com/2012/03/articles/watching-the-court/claims-under-the-north-carolina-securities-actare-easier-to-make-now/.
5. Trial Court Desktop, N.C. Bus. CT. (Oct. 16, 2012), http://www.ncbusinesscourt
.net/tcddotnetpublic/default.aspx?CID=3&caseNumber-I OCVS745.
6. Compare N.C. GEN. STAT. § 78A-56(a)(2) (2011), with 15 U.S.C. § 771(a)(2)
(2012); accordN.C. GEN. STAT. § 78A-8(2); 17 C.F.R. § 240.1Ob-5(b) (2011).
7. See Venturtech II v. Deloitte Haskins & Sells, 790 F. Supp. 576, 588 (E.D.N.C.
1992); State v. Davidson, 506 S.E.2d 743, 748 (N.C. Ct. App. 1998).
8. Compare N.C. GEN. STAT. § 78A-8, with 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b).
9. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976).
10. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 78A-56(a)(1), 78A-56(j).
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The other antifraud provision of the North Carolina Securities Act is
Section 78A-56(a)(2), which parallels the lesser-known Section 12(a)(2) of
the federal Securities Act of 1933." This provision of the North Carolina
law creates strict liability for material misrepresentations in connection
with the purchase or sale of securities, subject to an affirmative defense that
the person making the misrepresentation "did not know, and in the exercise
of reasonable care could not have known, of the untruth or omission."' 2
There is no requirement of scienter, nor is there any requirement that the
purchaser have relied on the misrepresentation. 3 Furthermore, while the
federal Section 12(a)(2) is significantly limited by the requirement that the
misrepresentation appear in a "prospectus," 4 Section 78A-56(a)(2) of the
North Carolina law contains no such limitation on its face." And, unlike
Rule lOb-5 and Section 78A-8(2), a private right of action clearly is
available under Section 78A-56(a)(2).' 6
Three recent opinions from the North Carolina Business Court have
taken a closer look at the requirements for a cause of action under the
antifraud provisions North Carolina Securities Act.' 7 The remainder of this
Article explores the antifraud provisions of the North Carolina Securities
Act, the distinctions from their federal counterparts, and the way in which
the North Carolina Business Court has recently interpreted these
provisions.
I.

SECTION 78A-8: NORTH CAROLINA'S
ANSWER TO RULE

101B-5

The first antifraud provision of the North Carolina Securities Act is
Section 78A-8, which states:
It is unlawful for any person, in connection with the offer, sale or
purchase of any security, directly or indirectly:
11. Compare id. § 78A-56(a)(2), with 15 U.S.C. § 771(a)(2).
12. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 78A-56(a)(2).
13. See id.
14. 15 U.S.C. § 771(a)(2).
15. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 78A-56(a)(2).
16. Id.
17. See Skoog v. Harbert Private Equity Fund, II, LLC, No. 12 CVS 406, 2013 NCBC
LEXIS 16 (N.C. Super. Ct. Mar. 24, 2013); NNN Durham Office Portfolio 1, LLC v.
Highwoods Realty Ltd. P'ship, No. 12 CVS 3945, 2013 NCBC LEXIS 11 (N.C. Super. Ct.
Feb. 19, 2013); Associated Packaging v. Jackson Paper Mfg., No. 10 CVS 745, 2012 NCBC
LEXIS 13 (N.C. Super. Ct. Mar. 1, 2012).
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(1)To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(2) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of
the circumstances under which they are made, not misleading or,
(3) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person.18
This section of the Act will look familiar to any securities law practitioner,
or indeed anyone who has taken the introductory corporations class in law
school; it is taken almost verbatim from the U.S Securities and Exchange
Commission's Rule lOb-5,' 9 which is probably the best known provision of
the federal securities laws. The resemblance is not accidental; the drafters
of the Uniform Securities Act of 1956, upon which the North Carolina
Securities Act is based, explained that "[t]his section is substantially the
Securities and Exchange Commission's [Rule lOb-5]." 20
Given that the North Carolina statute uses exactly the same language
as Rule 1Ob-5, and that it was deliberately based on the federal rule, one
might expect North Carolina courts to follow federal interpretations of Rule
1Ob-5 when interpreting Section 78A-8 of the North Carolina Securities
Act. And, in fact, North Carolina courts have stated that they do just that:
"N.C. Gen. Stat. § 78A-8 closely parallels the Rule 10b-5 antifraud
provision of the Securities Exchange Act. Cases construing the federal rule
are instructive when examining our statute." 21
At first glance, this all appears to be quite neat and tidy-the North
Carolina statute is a verbatim copy of Rule 1Ob-5, North Carolina courts
follow federal law when interpreting the statute, and, therefore, it would
seem that we can simply import wholesale all of the extensive case law and
commentary regarding the federal Rule 1Ob-5 into any case involving
Section 78A-8. Upon closer inspection, however, the interpretative issue is
not so simple. There are some important questions on which Section 78A8 may diverge significantly from Rule 1Ob-5, as discussed below.

18. N.C. GEN. STAT.

§ 78A-8.

19. 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5 (2011).
20. UNIF. SEC. ACT § 101 cmt. .01 (1956) (amended 2005); see also Skinner v. E.F.
Hutton & Co., 320 S.E.2d 424, 427 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984) ("The North Carolina securities
anti-fraud provision, G.S. 78A-8, closely parallels the S.E.C. Rule lOb-5."), rev'd on other
grounds, 333 S.E.2d 236 (N.C. 1985).
21. State v. Davidson, 506 S.E.2d 743, 748 (N.C. Ct. App. 1998) (internal citations
omitted).
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Is there a private right of action under Section 78A-8?

A fundamental-and thus far unanswered-question under Section
78A-8 of the North Carolina Securities Act is whether the section confers a
right of action upon private litigants. The Act is clear that, at least as to the
most important prong of Section 78A-8, it does not.
The North Carolina Securities Act contains provisions for
administrative, criminal, and civil enforcement. On the administrative side,
the North Carolina Securities Division of the Secretary of State's office is
authorized to seek injunctive relief, restitution, and in some cases civil
penalties for any violation of the Act.22 On the criminal side, a willful
violation of most provisions of the Act, including Section 78A-8, is defined
23
in the statute as a felony.
The civil remedies provision of the Act, however, makes clear that
private rights of action are available under only certain sections of the Act.
Specifically, civil liability under the North Carolina Securities Act is
imposed upon any person who "[o]ffers or sells a security in violation of
G.S. 78A-8(1), 78A-8(3), 78A-10(b), 78A-13, 78A-14, 78A-24, or 78A36(a), or of any rule or order under G.S. 78A-49(d) which requires the
affirmative approval of sales literature before it is used, or of any condition
imposed under G.S. 78A-27(d) or 78A-28(g)... .. 24 The statute thus
creates civil liability for violations of specified sections of the Act
(including Sections 78A-8(1) and 78A-8(3)), but not for Section 78A-

8(2).25
22. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 78A-47.
23. Id. § 78A-57(a2). For examples of criminal prosecutions under Section 78A-8, see
Davidson, 506 S.E.2d 743 and State v. Williams, 390 S.E. 2d 746 (N.C. Ct. App. 1990).
24. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 78A-56(a)(1).
25. In recent decisions arising under the North Carolina Securities Act, the North
Carolina Business Court affirmatively recognized-for the first time-that the Act creates
civil liability only for violations of the first and third prongs of 78A-8. Skoog v. Harbert
Private Equity Fund, II, LLC, No. 12 CVS 406, 2013 NCBC LEXIS 16, *33 (N.C. Super.
Ct. Mar. 24, 2013) ("Section 8 does not by its terms provide for civil liability for violations
of its provisions. Instead, Subsections (1) and (3) of § 8 are made actionable by §
56(a)(1)."); NNN Durham Office Portfolio 1, LLC v. Highwoods Realty Ltd. P'ship, No. 12
CVS 3945, 2013 NCBC LEXIS 11, *29 (N.C. Super. Ct. Feb. 19, 2013) ("One pathway [to
primary liability] sounds in fraud. .. and is represented by Section 78A-8 of the NCSA ... ,
of which violations in part are made actionable under § 56(a)(1)."); Blue Ridge Pediatric &
Adolescent Med., Inc. v. First Colony Healthcare, LLC, No. 11 CVS 127, 2012 NCBC
LEXIS 52, at *24-26 (N.C. Super. Ct. Oct. 3, 2012). In Skoog, the court recognized that the
private right of action is limited to scheme liability; liability for misrepresentations is
excluded. See Skoog, 2013 NCBC LEXIS 16, at *33-34, *38. If the appellate courts
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Section 78A-8(2), the provision for which no civil liability is created,
is the most important part of Section 78A-8. That prong of the statute
makes it unlawful to "make any untrue statement of a material fact or to
omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements
made, in the light of the circumstances under which they are made, not
misleading." 26 It is under this prong that almost all of the case law under
Rule lob-5 has developed. The other two prongs of the North Carolina
statute, like Rule 1Ob-5, do not prohibit material misstatements, but rather
prohibit fraudulent schemes.27 Federal courts, interpreting these other two
prongs of Rule lOb-5, have held that the "scheme liability" provisions do
not apply in cases of material misstatements or omissions-for claims of
material misstatement or omission, a plaintiff may proceed only under the
second prong. 28 The usefulness of the first and third prongs of Section
78A-8 to private plaintiffs is thus significantly limited. The heart of the
statute is in the second prong, and the second prong is not listed as one for
which there is civil liability.
Lest there be any confusion as to the significance of only certain
statutory provisions giving rise to civil remedies, the North Carolina
Securities Act, after enumerating the provisions of the Act for which civil
remedies are available, states: "The rights and remedies provided by this
Chapter are in addition to any other rights or remedies that may exist at law
or in equity, but this Chapter does not create any cause of action not
specified in this section or G.S. 78A-37(d)." 2 9 This language is taken

uphold these rulings, whether in these cases or another, it would establish a significant
difference between North Carolina and federal securities laws.
26. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 78A-8(2).
27. Id. §§ 78A-8(1), (3).
28. See Pub. Pension Fund Grp. v. KV Pharm. Co., 679 F.3d 972, 987 (8th Cir. 2012);
WPP Luxembourg Gamma Three Sarl v. Spot Runner, Inc., 655 F.3d 1039, 1057 (9th Cir.
2011); Lentell v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 396 F.3d 161, 177 (2d Cir. 2005); SEC v. Kelly, 817
F. Supp. 2d 340, 344 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). Presumably, this principle would apply in
interpreting "scheme liability" under the North Carolina Securities Act, although a recent
opinion from Judge Murphy seems to apply the scheme liability provisions to claims based
only on alleged misstatements. See Blue Ridge Pediatric & Adolescent Med., Inc. v. First
Colony Healthcare, LLC, No. 11 CVS 127, 2012 NCBC LEXIS 52, at *24-26 (N.C. Super.
Ct. Oct. 3, 2012).
29. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 78A-56(j) (emphasis added). Section 78A-37(d) allows the State
to require registered dealers and salespersons to post surety bonds and allows recovery
against those bonds in a suit under the North Carolina Securities Act. Id. § 78A-37(d).
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verbatim from Section 410(j) of the Uniform Securities Act of 1956.30 The
official comment to this section states:
Notwithstanding the presence of several specific liability provisions in each
of the several SEC statutes, the federal courts have implied a civil cause of
action by a defrauded seller against the buyer under SEC Rule X-Ob-5....
[This provision] is designed to assure that no comparable development is
based on violation of§ 101 of this Act.31

Section 101 of the Uniform Securities Act, in turn, is the provision upon
which Section 78A-8 is based.32 The North Carolina Securities Act was
thus drafted with the specific intention to exclude the implication of a
private right of action under the state-law equivalent of Rule 1Ob-5.
Given all this, it should be clear that there is no private right of action
for violations of Section 78A-8(2). But that is not necessarily the end of
the matter. It is well established that a private right of action is available
under federal Rule 1Ob-5, even though it is equally well established that
neither Congress nor the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
The federal
initially intended the rule to be enforced by private parties.
and by
1
Ob-5,
Rule
under
of
action
right
courts simply invented the private
without
the time the issue reached the U.S. Supreme Court, it was accepted
34
analysis that such a private right of action was available under the rule.
North Carolina courts conceivably could do the same with Section
78A-8(2). In fact, a number of North Carolina cases have assumed,
without ever explicitly addressing the issue, that a private right of action is
available under Section 78A-8(2)." At least one civil defendant has been
held liable by a jury in a lawsuit brought under the statute, with the verdict

30. UNIF. SEC. ACT § 410(j) (1956) (amended 2005).

31. Id.§410cmt..0l.
32. See Daniel B. Dean, Note, Underdevelopment of Securities Fraud in North
CarolinaCourts and the Potential Effect of the North CarolinaSecurities Act of 1975, 53
N.C. L. REv. 1104,1112 (1975).
33. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 196 (1976) ("Although [§] 10(b)
does not by its terms create an express civil remedy for its violation, and there is no
indication that Congress, or the Commission when adopting Rule IOb-5, contemplated such
a remedy, the existence of a private cause of action for violations of the statute and the Rule
is now well established.").
34. See Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971).
35. See, e.g., William L. Thorpe Revocable Trust v. Ameritas Inv. Corp., No. 4:11-CV193-D, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 134049, at *17-18 (E.D.N.C. Sept. 19, 2012); Bob
Timberlake Collection, Inc. v. Edwards, 626 S.E.2d 315, 322 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006); Latta v.
Rainey, 689 S.E.2d 898, 908-11 (N.C. Ct. App. 2010).
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being upheld on appeal.
Such a result, however, appears manifestly
inconsistent with the plain language of the statute.
B.

Is scienter an element ofa claim under Section 78A-8?

As to Sections 78A-8(1) and (3) and to Section 78A-8(2), if the North
Carolina courts continue to allow a private right of action under that latter
prong despite the statutory prohibition, the next question is whether the
statute is subject to a scienter requirement.
One of the most significant limitations on claims under federal Rule
1Ob-5 is the requirement that the plaintiff prove "scienter," meaning "a
mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud."0
Motions to dismiss securities fraud claims almost always include, as part of
the motion, an argument that the plaintiff has not adequately pled scienter,
and, indeed, an entire body of case law has developed around the pleading
requirements for this element of the claim.39 A recent study of motions to
dismiss in federal private securities fraud cases showed that 72% of the
motions contended that the plaintiff had not adequately pled scienter. 40 Of
those cases, the court found the pleading of scienter to be inadequate, at
least as to some claims, 77% of the time.4 1 Accordingly, the question of
whether such a requirement exists under North Carolina law is of great
importance.
Section 78A-8, like federal Rule 1Ob-5, has no scienter requirement on
its face. 42 Section 78A-8(2) makes it unlawful "[t]o make any untrue
36. See Latta, 689 S.E.2d at 908-11.
37. In Skoog and NNN Durham Office Portfolio 1, LLC, the court did not find any
legislative intent to provide a private right of action under Section 78A-8(2) and therefore
did not discuss whether scienter is a requirement under that prong, but it held that scienterand reliance-are necessary for liability under Sections 78A-8(1) and (3). Skoog v. Harbert
Private Equity Fund, II, LLC, No. 12 CVS 406, 2013 NCBC LEXIS 16, *33-35 (N.C.
Super. Ct. Mar. 24, 2013); NNN Durham Office Portfolio 1, LLC v. Highwoods Realty Ltd.
P'ship, No. 12 CVS 3945, 2013 NCBC LEXIS 11, *32-34 (N.C. Super. Ct. Feb. 19, 2013).
38. Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 193 n.12.
39. See, e.g., id.
40. Wendy G. Couture, The Falsity-Scienter Inference, 40 SEC. REG. L.J. 303, 304
(2012).
41. Id.
42. See AssociatedPackaging,Inc., 2012 NCBC LEXIS 13, at *33-36; Ernst & Ernst,
425 U.S. at 196. In Ernst & Ernst, the Court examined the three prongs of federal Rule lOb5. Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 196. Although there is no scienter requirement expressed
outright, prongs one and three clearly require a showing of scienter, albeit impliedly-it is
implied in the "defraud" provision of prong one, which makes it unlawful "[t]o employ any
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statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in
order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under
which they are made, not misleading." 43 Sections 78A-8(1) and (3) deal
with fraudulent schemes;44 the idea of "fraud" suggests scienter, but the
statute does not expressly require it. The U.S. Supreme Court has
nevertheless read a scienter requirement into Rule 1Ob-5 despite the
absence of any express scienter requirement in the rule itself.45 Given that
North Carolina courts have repeatedly stated their intent to follow federal
interpretations of Rule 1Ob-5, it would seem logical that a scienter
requirement would likewise be read into the North Carolina rule.
However, as Judge Murphy pointed out in his Associated Packaging
opinion, the U.S. Supreme Court's importation of a scienter requirement
into Rule 1Ob-5 was based, in part, on administrative law doctrines.46 The
rule was adopted by the SEC pursuant to its authority under Section 10(b)
of the Securities and Exchange Act, which gives the SEC rulemaking
power to prohibit the use of "any manipulative or deceptive device or
contrivance."4 7 Because Section 10(b)-the statutory authority for Rule
1Ob-5-gives the SEC rulemaking authority only as to "manipulative or
deceptive" behavior, any SEC rule based on Section 10(b) would
necessarily be so limited as well. And the phrase "manipulative or
deceptive," in turn, implies scienter.48
Section 78A-8 of the North Carolina Securities Act, in contrast, was
enacted directly by the legislature. Accordingly, the administrative law
considerations that affect the interpretation of Rule 10b-5 are inapplicable
in interpreting the North Carolina statute.4 9 In other words, there is no

device, scheme, or artifice to defraud." Id. Likewise, scienter is implied in the "fraud or
deceit" provision of prong 3, which makes it unlawful "[t]o engage in any act, practice, or
course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person."
Id.; cf In re Alstom SA Sec. Litig., 406 F. Supp. 2d 433, 474 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (holding that
scienter is a requirement for a claim under Rule 10b-5(a) or (c)).
43. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 78A-8(2) (2011).
44. Id. §§ 78A-8(1), (3).
45. See Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 193.
46. AssociatedPackaging,2012 NCBC LEXIS 13, at *33.
47. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012); see also Associated Packaging,2012 NCBC LEXIS 13,
at *30-32; Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 197.
48. See Ernst & Ernst,425 U.S. at 197.
49. Cf Teague v. Bakker, 35 F.3d 978, 991 (4th Cir. 1994) ("We must assume that the
North Carolina legislature consciously chose to model its anti-fraud provision on an SEC
rule and not on the underlying federal statute.").
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North Carolina equivalent of federal Section 10(b) to influence the
interpretation of Section 78A-8.
Even absent the Section 10(b) issue, however, there are reasons to
read a scienter requirement into Section 78A-8. While it is true that the
section contains no scienter requirement on its face, that is because it
contains no culpability standard at all on its face. 50 Read literally, Section
78A-8(2) would impose strict liability for any material misstatement. It is
hard to believe that the General Assembly intended such a result. If one
assumes that some culpability standard must be read into the statute, then it
makes sense that North Carolina courts would look to federal law to pick
the standard-and federal law imposes a scienter requirement. 5
C.

Is reliance an element ofa claim under Section 78A-8?

In addition to scienter, another requirement that federal courts have
read into Rule 1Ob-5 is reliance. Pursuant to this requirement, for a private
plaintiff to recover under the rule, the plaintiff must prove that he or she
relied on the allegedly false representation.5 2 Nothing on the face of Rule
1Ob-5 expressly requires reliance. 53 Rather, the federal courts have
reasoned that because the private cause of action under Rule lOb-5 is
implied, rather than express, the courts would look to the most closely
analogous express cause of action-Section 18(a) of the Exchange Actfor guidance, and that provision contains an express reliance requirement.54
Once again, the federal courts' reasoning cannot be seamlessly applied
to the North Carolina statute because there are no "implied" causes of
action under the North Carolina statute.55 As explained above, as to
Section 78A-8(2), the statute expressly rejects any implied cause of
action.
As to the other prongs of the statute-Sections 78A-8(1) and
78A-8(3)--the private cause of action is express, rather than implied."
50. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 78A-8(2) (2011).
51. Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 193.
52. See, e.g., Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 243 (1988). For exchange-traded
securities, plaintiffs can show reliance via the "fraud on the market" theory. Id. at 247.
53. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2011).
54. See Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S.
164, 178 (1994).
55. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 78A-8(2).
56. Id.; see also id. § 78A-56.
57. Id. §§ 78A-8(1), (3); see also id. § 78A-56(a)(1); Skoog v. Harbert Private Equity
Fund, II, LLC, No. 12 CVS 406, 2013 NCBC LEXIS 16, *10, *33 (N.C. Super. Ct. Mar. 24,
2013).
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Thus, in considering whether 78A-8 contains a reliance requirement,
North Carolina courts will need to look at the language of the statute,
policy considerations, and other issues beyond simply what the federal
courts have done under federal law. Although the statute does not
expressly require reliance, the language can be read to support such a
requirement. The first and third prongs deal with fraudulent schemes; the
idea of "fraud" suggests reliance. And indeed, federal courts dealing with
the first and third prongs of Rule 1Ob-5 have found a reliance requirement,
8
even though those prongs do not directly parallel Section 18(a).1 The
second prong deals with "misleading" statements; the idea of being misled
likewise suggests a reliance requirement. Furthermore, reliance is an
implicit part of any claim for damages because "[r]eliance provides the
requisite causal connection between a defendant's misrepresentation and a
plaintiffs injury." 59
At least two federal cases-both assuming without discussion the
existence of a private right of action-have held that reliance is an element
of a civil claim under Rule 78A-8.6 0 One of those cases, however,
explicitly admits that the court is guessing as to what a North Carolina state
court would do. 6 ' The other simply asserts without support that reliance is
62
"an element of a claim under the North Carolina Securities Act." More
recently, a pair of North Carolina Business Court opinions have held that
3
The North
reliance is an element of a claim under Section 78A-8.
issue.
the
address
to
yet
have
however,
courts,
Carolina appellate
II.

SECTION 78A-56(A)(2): NORTH CAROLINA'S
ANSWER TO SECTION 12(A)(2)

Section 78A-8, discussed in the last section, has been mistakenly
described by at least one court as "the antifraud provision of the North

58. See, e.g., In re Alstom SA Sec. Litig., 406 F. Supp. 2d 433,474 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
59. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 243 (1988).
60. Teague v. Bakker, 35 F.3d 978, 992 (4th Cir. 1994); Jadoff v. Gleason, 140 F.R.D.
330, 334 (M.D.N.C. 1991).
61. See Teague, 35 F.3d at 991.
62. Jadoff, 140 F.R.D. at 334.
63. Skoog v. Harbert Private Equity Fund, II, LLC, No. 12 CVS 406, 2013 NCBC
LEXIS 16, *35 (N.C. Super. Ct. Mar. 24, 2013); NNN Durham Office Portfolio 1, LLC v.
Highwoods Realty Ltd. P'ship, No. 12 CVS 3945, 2013 NCBC LEXIS 11, *33-35 (N.C.
Super. Ct. Feb. 19, 2013).

Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 2013

11

Campbell Law Review, Vol. 35, Iss. 2 [2013], Art. 1

220

CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35:209

Carolina Securities Act."6 In fact, there is a second antifraud provision of
the North Carolina Securities Act. This second provision is found in
Section 78A-56 of the Act, and reads as follows:
Any person who ... [o]ffers or sells a security by means of any untrue
statement of a material fact or any omission to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading (the purchaser
not knowing of the untruth or omission), and who does not sustain the
burden of proof that he did not know, and in the exercise of reasonable care
could not have known, of the untruth or omission, is liable to the person
purchasing the security from him, who may sue either at law or in equity to
recover the consideration paid for the security . ...
.
Section 78A-56(a)(2) closely resembles 15 U.S.C. § 771(a)(2), which
reads:
Any person who . .. offers or sells a security (whether or not exempted by
the provisions of section 77c of this title, other than paragraphs (2) and (14)
of subsection (a) of said section), by the use of any means or instruments of
transportation or communication in interstate commerce or of the mails, by
means of a prospectus or oral communication, which includes an untrue
statement of a material fact or omits to state a material fact necessary in
order to make the statements, in the light of the circumstances under which
they were made, not misleading (the purchaser not knowing of such untruth
or omission), and who shall not sustain the burden of proof that he did not
know, and in the exercise of reasonable care could not have known, of such
untruth or omission, shall be liable, subject to subsection (b) of this section,
to the person purchasing such security from him, who may sue either at law
or in equity in any court of competent jurisdiction, to recover the
consideration paid for such security with interest thereon. ...
The resemblance is intentional. Section 78A-56(a)(2) of the North
Carolina Securities Act is based on Section 410 of the Uniform Securities
Act, which in turn recognizes that "[t]his clause is almost identical with §
12(a)(2) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 771(2).",67 Thus, Section
78A-56(a)(2) of the North Carolina Act was intended to parallel Section
12(a)(2) of the federal Securities Act.
Given that Section 78A-56(a)(2) was borrowed from Section 12(a)(2)
of the federal Securities Act, one would expect courts interpreting Section
64. Teague, 35 F.3d at 985 (emphasis added).
65. N.C. GEN STAT. § 78A-56(a)(2) (2011).
66. 15 U.S.C. § 771(a)(2) (2012).
67. UNIF. SEC. ACT § 410(a)(2) cmt. .01 (1956) (amended 2005).
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78A-56(a)(2) to look to judicial interpretations of the corresponding federal
law. And that is exactly what has happened. As the Eastern District of
North Carolina has stated: "Because § 78A-56 parallels § 12(a)(2) of the
1933 Act, cases construing § 12(a)(2) should be considered when
interpreting § 78A-56."" The North Carolina Business Court has likewise
held that this section should be interpreted in accordance with its federal
counterpart.
The prohibition created by Section 78A-56(a)(2)---offering or selling
a security "by means of any untrue statement of a material fact or any
omission to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements
made, in light of the circumstances under which they were made, not
misleading" 70-is substantially identical to that which is prohibited under
Section 78A-8(2), which was discussed in the prior section. As a result,
some courts have treated Sections 78A-8(2) and 78A-56(a)(2)
interchangeably. 7 1 There are, however, significant differences between the
two sections.
First, the complicated issues that arise under Section 78A-8 are much
simpler under Section 78A-56(a)(2), and all in ways that favor private
plaintiffs:
* Private right of action. There is indisputably a private right of action
under Section 78A-56(a)(2). Indeed, this section appears in the section
of the statute titled "Civil Liabilities.""
* Scienter. There is no scienter requirement under Section 78A-56(a)(2).
Not only does no scienter requirement appear on the face of the statute,
but cases under the parallel federal law have expressly rejected a
scienter requirement.7 3
* Reliance. A plaintiff proceeding under Section 78A-56(a)(2) need not
show reliance on the alleged misrepresentation or omission. Again,
there is no reliance requirement on the face of the statute, and cases
68. Venturtech II v. Deloitte Haskins & Sells, 790 F. Supp. 576, 588 (E.D.N.C. 1992).
69. See NNN Durham Office Portfolio 1, LLC v. Highwoods Realty Ltd. P'ship, No. 12
CVS 3945, 2013 NCBC LEXIS 11, *37-38 (N.C. Super. Ct. Feb. 19, 2013).
70. N.C. GEN STAT. § 78A-56(a)(2).
71. See, e.g., Latta v. Rainey, 689 S.E.2d 898, 908 (N.C. Ct. App. 2010); Bob
Timberlake Collection, Inc. v. Edwards, 626 S.E.2d 315, 322 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006).
72. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 78A-56.
73. See, e.g., Shaw v. Digital Equip. Corp., 82 F.3d 1194, 1217 (1st Cir. 1996) ("[A]
Rule 1Ob-5 plaintiff, unlike a plaintiff asserting claims under Section 11 or 12(a)(2) of the
Securities Act, must establish that the defendant acted with scienter, and that the plaintiff's
reliance on the defendant's misstatement caused his injury.").
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under the parallel federal statute have expressly rejected a reliance
requirement. 74
Not only is there no scienter requirement under Section 78A-56(a)(2), a
plaintiff does not even need to prove negligence on the part of a defendant.
Rather, the statute creates strict liability for material misstatements or
omissions, subject to an affirmative defense if a defendant can prove "that
he did not know, and in the exercise of reasonable care could not have
known, of the untruth or omission.",7 The burden shifting is not a mere
technicality-by relieving a plaintiff of the burden to show negligence, it
becomes considerably more difficult for a defendant to dismiss a securities
fraud claim under Rule 12(b)(6).
There are, however, limitations on a cause of action under Section
78A-56(a)(2) that are not present under Rule lOb-5 or its North Carolina
counterpart. First, liability is limited to a person who "offers or sells" a
security.76 This means that the buyer's cause of action is against only: (a)
the person from whom the buyer purchased the security; and (b) brokers
and others who solicited the purchase.77 Additionally, professionals who

74. See, e.g., id.; see also Bradley v. Hullander, 249 S.E.2d 486, 494, 499 (S.C. 1978)
(holding that equivalent provision of the South Carolina Securities Act does not require
reliance and that merely negligent misrepresentations or omissions are sufficient to trigger
liability under the statute).
75. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 78A-56(a)(2); accord Sullivan v. Mebane Packaging Grp., Inc.,
581 S.E.2d 452, 463 (N.C. Ct. App. 2003) (setting forth the elements of claim under the
statute). Setting them out specifically, the North Carolina Business Court stated that
[T]he elements of a claim under § 56(a)(2) include: (1) a statement
which was false or misleading, or which under the circumstances was
false or misleading because of the omission of other facts (the
.purchaser not knowing of the untruth or omission); (2) that such
statement was material; and (3) that such statement was made by one
who offered or sold a security. The offeror or seller may escape
liability for such a false or misleading statement if he can show that
he did not know and in the exercise of reasonable diligence could not
have known that the statement was false or misleading.
NNN Durham Office Portfolio 1, LLC v. Highwoods Realty Ltd. P'ship, No. 12 CVS 3945,
2013 NCBC LEXIS 11, *38-39 (N.C. Super. Ct. Feb. 19, 2013).
76. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 78A-56(a)(2).
77. See Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622, 646-47 (1988); State v. Williams, 390 S.E.2d 746,
749 (N.C. Ct. App. 1990). A parallel provision allows defrauded sellers to recover from
buyers, but the "quasi-privity" requirement is still present. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 78A56(b).
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provide services in connection with a sale are not directly liable under the
statute.
In addition, the remedy for violations of Section 78A-56(a)(2) is
expressly defined as and limited to rescission. 79 Other measures or forms
of damages are not available. Indeed, a defendant can preclude a lawsuit
under 78A-56(a)(2) by making a pre-suit offer to refund the plaintiffs
purchase price (with interest).o Whether the rescission remedy is better or
worse than a standard damages remedy depends on the particular case.
A cause of action under Section 78A-56(a)(2) does not, however,
appear to be encumbered by the most significant limitation on its federal
counterpart-namely, the "prospectus" requirement. Section 12(a)(2) of
the federal Securities Act limits liability to persons who offer or sell a
security "by means of a prospectus."81 The United States Supreme Court
has interpreted this language to mean that a cause of action lies under
Section 12(a)(2) only for statements contained in "documents related to
public offerings by an issuer . . . ."82 Thus, private offerings and secondary
market transactions are effectively exempt from Section 12(a)(2).
North Carolina's statute-Section 78A-56--does not contain the
"prospectus" language of its federal counterpart. 83 Thus, on its face, the
North Carolina statute has a much broader scope than the federal statute.

78. See Pinter,486 U.S. at 651. It is unclear whether a cause of action might lie against
service providers under an "aiding and abetting" theory. Cf. Venturtech 1l v. Deloitte
Haskins & Sells, 790 F. Supp. 576, 587 (E.D.N.C. 1992) (noting but declining to address the
"aiding and abetting" issue in the context of the commission of a fraud); Bennett v. Durham,
683 F.3d 734 (6th Cir. 2012) (affirming judgment as a matter of law under state Securities
Act for attorneys involved in securities transaction because they were not "agents" under the
statute). The North Carolina Securities Act, however, expressly creates liability for certain
persons who "materially aid[]" in a transaction. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 78A-56(c); NNN
Durham Office Portfolio 1, LLC v. Highwoods Realty Ltd. P'ship, No. 12 CVS 3945, 2013
NCBC LEXIS 11, *42-49 (N.C. Super. Ct. Feb. 19, 2013) (interpreting "materially aid" as
contributing substantial assistance to the act or conduct).
79. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 78A-56(a) (allowing an aggrieved party "to recover the
consideration paid for the security, together with interest at the legal rate from the date of
payment, costs, and reasonable attorneys' fees"). This is the exclusive remedy not only for
Section 78A-56(a)(2), but for all civil actions under the North Carolina Securities Act. See
generally id.
80. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 78A-56(g)(1); Mashburn v. First Investors Corp., 432 S.E.2d
869, 871-72 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993).
81. 15 U.S.C. § 77/(a)(2) (2012).
82. Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 569 (1995).
83. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 78A-56(a)(2).
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Statutory language, however, was not the only consideration applied
by the United States Supreme Court in limiting the reach of Section
12(a)(2). The Court also stated:
It is understandable that Congress would provide buyers with a right to
rescind, without proof of fraud or reliance, as to misstatements contained in
a document prepared with care, following well-established procedures
relating to investigations with due diligence and in the context of a public
offering by an issuer or its controlling shareholders. It is not plausible to
infer that Congress created this extensive liability for every casual
communication between buyer and seller in the secondary market. It is
often difficult, if not altogether impractical, for those engaged in casual
communications not to omit some fact that would, if included, qualify the
accuracy of a statement.
Under [plaintiffs] view any casual
communication between buyer and seller in the aftermarket could give rise
to an action for rescission, with no evidence of fraud on the part of the
seller or reliance on the part of the buyer. In many instances buyers in
practical effect would have an option to rescind, impairing the stability of
past transactions where neither fraud nor detrimental reliance on
misstatements or omissions occurred. We find no basis for interpreting the
statute to reach so far. 84
Those same policy concerns are present under North Carolina's
statute. It remains to be seen whether North Carolina courts, like their
federal counterparts, will find a way to limit the scope of Section 78A56(a)(2) in light of these concerns. Delaware, for example, has a statute
nearly identical to Section 78A-56(a)(2)." Delaware courts, however, have
held that the statute does not create an independent cause of action; rather
the statute must be read in connection with the Delaware equivalent of Rule
1Ob-5,which parallels North Carolina's Section 78A-8. 6

84. Gustafson, 513 U.S. at 578; see also id. at 594 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("I share the
majority's concern that extending § 12(a)(2) to secondary and private transactions might
result in an unwanted increase in securities litigation."). Academic commentators have
suggested that policy concerns were the driving reason for the Supreme Court's narrow
interpretation of the "prospectus" requirement. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Securities
Act Section 12(a)(2) After the Gustafson Debacle, 50 Bus. LAw. 1231, 1253-57 (1995).
85. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6 § 73-605(a)(2) (2011).
86. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6 § 73-201 (2011); Singer v. Magnovox Co., 367 A.2d
1349, 1360-61 (Del. Ch. 1976), rev'don other grounds, 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977); Cooper
v. Celente, C.A. No. 90C-JL-215 1992 Del. Super. LEXIS 370, at *8 (Del. Super. Ct. Sept.
3, 1992). See also Organ v. Byron, 435 F. Supp. 2d 388, 393 (D. Del. 2006).
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III. THE REACH OF THE NORTH CAROLINA SECURITIES ACT

The civil liability provisions of the North Carolina Securities Act
reach broadly. They apply "to persons who sell or offer to sell when (i) an
offer to sell is made in this State, or (ii) an offer to buy is made and
accepted in this state."87 The Act defines an offer as being made in North
Carolina "when the offer (i) originates from this State or (ii) is directed by
the offeror to this State and received at the place to which it is
directed...."8
There is an express exception for broadly circulated
publications or media broadcasts, even if they reach North Carolina. 89
Federal law imposes few limits on the reach of the antifraud
provisions of North Carolina Securities Act. The most significant federal
restriction is the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998
("SLUSA"), which generally prohibits fraud-based state law securities
claims from being brought as class actions.90 Thus, claims under the
antifraud provisions of the North Carolina Securities Act must be asserted
on an individual basis.
Although the National Securities Markets
Improvement Act of 1996 ("NSMIA") preempts many state securities laws
regarding securities registration, it does not preempt state laws with respect
to "fraud or deceit." 9 1 Meanwhile, the Private Securities Litigation Reform
Act of 1995 ("PSLRA") applies only to claims arising under the federal
securities laws. 92
CONCLUSION

The antifraud provisions of the North Carolina Securities Act are
commonly misunderstood both by practitioners and the courts, in large part
because those provisions are mistakenly assumed to be duplicative of
corresponding provisions of federal law. The North Carolina provisions,
however, differ from federal law in important ways that courts and
practitioners should keep in mind.

87.
sellers.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

N.C. GEN. STAT. § 78A-63(a). There is a parallel provision for claims brought by
See id. § 78A-63(b).
Id. § 78A-63(c).
Id. § 78A-63(e).
15 U.S.C. § 78bb(f) (2012).
Id. § 77r(c).
Id. § 78u-4.
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